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Abstract
Bub has recently claimed that the Frauchiger-Renner argument
does not require an assumption that the state vector undergoes pro-
jection after measurement. It is shown that this claim is not true, and
an alternative understanding of the argument is offered.
The argument [2] for which Bub offers an understanding [1] is intended
to be a proof that the following three statements are inconsistent because
they imply a contradiction.
Rule Q: If an agent A has established that a quantum system Q is in
a state |ψ〉Q at time t0, and the Born probability of the outcome ξ of a
measurement of an observable x on Q in the state |ψ〉Q completed at time t
is 1, then agent A can conclude: “I am certain that x = ξ at time t.”
Rule C: If an agent A has established: “I am certain that another agent
A, whose inferences about certainty are in accordance with Rules Q, C, and
S, is certain that x = ξ at time t”, then agent A can conclude: “I am certain
that x = ξ at time t”.
Rule S: If an agent A has established “I am certain that x = ξ at time
t”, then agent A cannot also establish “I am certain that x 6= ξ at time t”.
The argument proceeds by considering a composite quantum system con-
sisting of a quantum coin C, a qubit Q and four agents F , F , W , W , which
evolves in response to various actions by the agents (for details see [2] and
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[1]). Several authors (e.g. [5]) have pointed out that the argument relies
on more assumptions than the three rules Q, C and S; in particular, that
a measurement leads to projection of the quantum state to an eigenstate of
the measured observable, at least for some observers [3]. Bub denies this. He
writes (in italics)
The Frauchiger-Renner argument does not assume, nor needs to
assume, anything other than a successive unitary evolution of the
global quantum state through each stage of the experiment — in
particular, the argument does not assume that the quantum state
undergoes a collapse for observers inside a laboratory but not for
outside observers.
Bub’s italics do not make this a true statement. Its falsity becomes
clear in Bub’s next paragraph but one, where he describes the step in the
Frauchiger-Renner thought experiment in which the agent F makes an infer-
ence about the result of a future measurement by W of a variable w. This
inference is based on the result of a measurement by F of the variable r
(the result of a quantum coin toss) and her subsequent action. To make
the inference as required for the Frauchiger-Renner argument, F must apply
unitary evolution (incorporating the future conduct of the experiment) to
the state in which r takes the value given by her measurement, not to the
global quantum state — in other words, she must assume that the quantum
state undergoes a projection (or “collapse”). The outside observer W , on the
other hand, does not assume this collapse.
It is so obvious that the argument requires this assumption of collapse that
it is worth trying to understand how Bub could have thought it reasonable
to deny it. This will bring out the true significance of the Frauchiger-Renner
argument. Bub (following Frauchiger and Renner) takes it to be required
by standard quantum mechanics that unitary evolution is to be applied to
the state revealed by experiment; this is taken to be included in Rule Q.
In his subsequent exposition Bub makes it clear that he regards this state
as just one component |Ψ(tails)〉 of the global state; apparently this is the
basis for his claim that there is no assumption of collapse. But this conceals
the assumption of collapse in the content of the component |Ψ(tails)〉, which
includes F ’s mental state “I am certain that w = fail at n : 31”, which she has
inferred from the result of her measurement of r. Apparently he thinks that
the evolution of each “branch” of the global state vector (in the terminology
of Everettians) is independent of the other branches. The Frauchiger-Renner
argument shows that this is not true in quantum mechanics.
How should F argue if she does not assume projection of the state vector
after her measurement? Surely, if she observes the result r = tails, she is
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correct to say “I know that r = tails” and then to form certainties about the
future on the basis of this fact? No. If she believes that there is a successive
unitary evolution of the global quantum state, then she will say I know that
I am in a superposition and I will therefore apply quantum mechanics with
this superposition as initial condition. In that case she does not believe that
W will observe w = fail.
Does this mean that F doesnt believe the evidence of her eyes? No. F
sees that the quantum coin came down r = tails. This is indeed a fact. It
might have come down r = heads, but it didnt. But as a well-brought-up
quantum physicist, she knows that although r = tails is a fact, it is only a
fact relative to her mental state, not a fact about the universal state. It is the
universal state, with a component in which r = heads, that determines the
future evolution. This is the true lesson of the Frauchiger-Renner argument:
What might have happened, but didnt, can still affect the future
course of events.
This looks disastrous for the conduct of science. How can we know what
might have happened, but didn’t, without knowing the whole history of the
universe? How can we proceed if we cannot trust our experiments to give us
objective facts? These worries are resolved by considering the artificiality of
the Frauchiger-Renner scenario, in which simple qubits are meant to repre-
sent sentient, reasoning agents. In reality, a system with sufficient complex-
ity to represent such agents would have a macroscopic number of degrees of
freedom and would necessarily interact with a macroscopic environment. For
such systems the effect of decoherence [4] is to make the effect of “what might
have happened but didn’t” utterly negligible, and to destroy the coherent su-
perposition necessary for the Frauchiger-Renner argument. Nevertheless, the
argument is valuable in demonstrating that parts of what we normally take
to be standard quantum mechanics are, according to the strict theory, valid
only (but reliably) for all practical purposes.
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